Abstract: This paper presents an efficient scheme for computing elliptic curve scalar multiplication. The proposed scheme uses side-channel atomicity to resist against simple power analysis (SPA) attacks. The inherent parallelism within point operations is exploited to perform parallel computations of atomic blocks within the same point operation. The computations of atomic blocks of subsequent point operations are then overlapped to increase the performance. The proposed scheme reduces the required memory location requirement by 35% in comparison to the pipelined scheme of Mishra (2006). In addition, the time complexity of the proposed scheme is improved by 17% and 21% in comparison to the pipelined scheme using binary and NAF encoding, respectively. Differential power analysis (DPA) attacks are also considered in the proposed scheme. Two countermeasures, randomizing the scalar multiplier and randomizing the projective coordinates, are applied together to immunize the scheme against DPA attacks. The time complexity of the proposed scheme with resistance against DPA attacks is improved by 6% and 13% in comparison to the pipelined scheme using binary and NAF encoding, respectively. The proposed scheme is also applied to the Comb scalar multiplication algorithm. The results show that the proposed scheme is highly efficient in comparison to the pipelined scheme, which outperformed previous sequential and parallel schemes.
Introduction
Elliptic curve cryptosystems (ECCs) have been attracting increasing attention (Koblitz, 1987) . Standards for ECCs have been adopted by the IEEE, ANSI, NIST, SEC, and WTLS. The ability of ECCs to use smaller key sizes and the computationally more efficient ECC algorithms in comparison to those used in earlier public key cryptosystems such as RSA (Rivest et al., 1978) and ElGamal (El Gamal, 1985) are two main reasons why elliptic curve cryptosystems are becoming more popular. They are considered particularly suitable for implementation on smart cards or mobile devices.
Because of the physical characteristics of such devices and their use in potentially hostile environments, side channel attacks (SCAs) on such devices are considered serious threats (Kocher, 1996; Kocher et al., 1999) . Side channel attacks seek to break the security of these devices through observing their power consumption trace or computation timing. Careless or naive implementation of cryptosystems allows side channel attacks to infer the secret key or obtain partial information about it. Thus, designers of cryptosystems seek to introduce algorithms and designs that are not only efficient, but also side channel attack resistant.
Two main types of SCAs have gained considerable attention: simple power analysis (SPA) attacks and differential power analysis (DPA) attacks. An SPA attack uses only a single observation of the power consumption, whereas a DPA attack uses many observations of the power consumption together with statistical tools. Several countermeasures against SPA and DPA attacks have been proposed in the literature (Coron, 1999; Ha & Moon, 2002; Okeya & Sakurai, 2000; Liardet & Smart, 2001; Joye & Quisquater, 2001; Joye & Tymen, 2001a; Mamiya et al., 2004; Chevallier-Mames et al., 2004) . However, almost all of the proposed countermeasures involve some computational overhead to resist against SCAs.
Chevallier- Mames et al. (2004) proposed side-channel atomicity as an efficient countermeasure against SPA attacks. Side-channel atomicity involves almost no computational overhead to resist against SPA attacks. It splits the elliptic curve point operations into atomic blocks that are indistinguishable from each other. Hence, sidechannel atomicity is considered to be an inexpensive countermeasure that does not leak any data regarding the operation being performed.
The primary operation of ECCs is scalar multiplication. Scalar multiplication in the group of points of an elliptic curve is analogous to exponentiation in the multiplicative group of integers modulo a fixed integer m. The scalar multiplication operation, denoted as kP, where k is an integer and P is a point on the elliptic curve, represents the addition of k copies of point P. Scalar multiplication is computed by a series of point doubling and point addition operations of the point P depending on the bit sequence representing the scalar multiplier k. Several scalar multiplication algorithms have been proposed in the literature. A good survey is conducted by Gordon (1998) .
Recently, Mishra (2006) proposed pipelining the field computations of the point operations. Each point operation is divided into two parts. One part begins execution as soon as the corresponding part of the input is available to it. Thus, more than one point operation can be executed in a two-stage pipeline. Side-channel atomicity has been used in Mishra (2006) to resist against SPA attacks. Each point operation in Mishra (2006) is segmented into atomic blocks that contain one field multiplication, two field additions, and one field negation. Resistance against DPA attacks is also considered in Mishra (2006) . The empty slots within the pipelined computations are exploited to provide resistance against DPA attacks. This paper presents overlapped parallel computations of scalar multiplication with resistance against SCAs. In the proposed scheme, atomic blocks of the same point operation are computed in parallel. The computations of atomic blocks of subsequent point operations are then overlapped to increase the performance.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a brief introduction to ECCs. Section 3 presents side channel attacks. Section 4 describes the proposed overlapped parallel computations scheme and compares the efficiency of the proposed scheme with Mishra's (2006) pipelined scheme. Section 5 shows how to apply the proposed scheme to the Comb scalar multiplication algorithm. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.
Elliptic Curve Preliminaries
The elliptic curve cryptosystem (ECC), which was originally proposed by Niel Koblitz and Victor Miller in 1985 (Koblitz, 1987) , is seen as a serious alternative to RSA because the key size of ECC is much shorter that that of RSA. ECC with a key size of 128-256 bits is shown to offer security equal to that of RSA with a key size of 1-2K bits. To date, no significant breakthroughs have been made in determining weaknesses in the EC algorithm, which is based on the discrete logarithm problem over points on an elliptic curve. The fact that the problem appears so difficult to crack means that key sizes can be reduced considerably, even exponentially. This makes ECC a serious challenger to RSA. ECCs have gained popularity for cryptographic applications because of the short key length compared with earlier public key cryptosystems such as RSA and ElGamal. They are considered particularly suitable for implementation on smart cards or mobile devices.
Extensive research has been done on the underlying math, security strength, and efficient implementation of ECCs. Among the different fields that can underlie elliptic curves, prime fields GF(p) and binary fields GF(2 m ) have been shown to be best suited for cryptographic applications. An elliptic curve E over the finite field GF(p) defined by the parameters a, b ∈ GF(p) with p > 3, consists of the set of points P = (x, y), where x, y ∈ GF(p), that satisfy the equation:
where a, b ∈ GF(p) and 4a 3 + 27b 2 ≠ 0 mod p together with the additive identity of the group point O known as the "point at infinity" (Koblitz, 1987) . The number of points #E on an elliptic curve over a finite field GF(q) is defined by Hasse's theorem (McEliece, 1987) .
It is well known that E forms a commutative finite group, with O as the group identity, under the addition operation known as the tangent and chord method. Explicit rational formulas for the addition rule involve several field arithmetic operations (addition, squaring, multiplication, and inversion) in the underlying finite field. The group operations in an affine coordinate system involve finite field inversion, which is a very costly operation, particularly over prime fields. Projective coordinate systems are used to eliminate the need for performing inversion. Several projective coordinate systems have been proposed in the literature (Cohen et al., 1998) , including the homogeneous, Jacobian, Chudnovsky-Jacobian, modified Jacobian, and mixed coordinate systems. For the homogeneous coordinate system, an elliptic curve point P takes the form (x, y) = (X/Z, Y/Z), while for the Jacobian coordinate system, P takes the
Two coordinate systems have been proposed based on the Jacobian coordinate system: the Chudnovsky-Jacobian coordinate system, in which a point P is represented with the quintuple (X, Y, Z, Z 2 , Z 3 ), and the modified Jacobian coordinate system, in which the point is represented with the quadruple (X, Y, Z, aZ 4 ). The mixed coordinate system yields a performance better than that of other coordinate systems (Cohen et al., 1998) . Hence, the mixed coordinate system is selected for the proposed scheme.
Several scalar multiplication algorithms have been proposed in the literature (Gordon, 1998) Algorithm 1 (Double-and-add)
Non-adjacent form (NAF) reduces the average number of point additions to (m/3) (Joye & Tymen, 2001b) . In NAF, signed-digit representations are used such that the scalar multiplier's coefficient k i ∈ {0, ±1}. NAF has the property that no two consecutive coefficients are nonzero. NAF also has the property that every positive integer k has a unique NAF encoding, denoted NAF(k). Algorithm 2 shows a NAF double-and-add scalar multiplication algorithm. The NAF double-and-add algorithm inspects the bits of the scalar multiplier k, and if the inspected bit k i = 0, only point doubling is performed. If, however, the inspected bit k i ≠ 0, both point doubling and addition/subtraction are performed.
Algorithm 2 ( AF double-and-add)
Among the different scalar multiplication algorithms with precomputations, two efficient ones are the Window algorithm (Cohen, 2005) and the Comb algorithm (Lim & Lee, 1994) . The basic Window algorithm does not reduce the number of doublings.
Efficiency is gained by reducing the number of additions. If the scalar multiplier k is of n bits in length, the Window algorithm requires (n -1) doublings. However, the Comb algorithm is even more attractive, as it requires significantly fewer doublings. The following paragraph gives a brief description of the Comb algorithm, which is very efficient in the fixed base point scenario of scalar multiplication.
Let the binary representation of the scalar multiplier k be of m bits in length. Let w be a small integer and let t equal the ceiling of (m/w). We append (tw -m) bits in the left of the binary representation of k and we divide the resulting bit string into w bit strings of length t each. Let these bit strings be K w_1 , K w_2 , … ,K 1 ,K 0 . Then, the bit strings K j can be written as the rows of an exponent array:
which is then processed columnwise, one after another. The computation is accelerated by precomputing the points
The scalar multiplication is then computed by Algorithm 3 and requires (t-1) point doubling and on the average ((2 w -1/2 w )t-1) additions.
Side Channel Attacks
Side channel attacks are usually divided into two types: simple power analysis (SPA) attacks, which are based on a single observation of power consumption, and differential power analysis (DPA) attacks, which combine SPA attacks with an error-correcting technique using statistical analysis (Kocher, 1996; Kocher et al., 1999) . Classical DPA attacks have been extensively researched for each cryptosystem, but new types of DPA attacks are continuously being developed. Many of the existing countermeasures are vulnerable to the more recent attacks, which include the doubling attack (Fouque & Valette, 2003) , refined power analysis (RPA) (Goubin, 2003) , and zero-value point (ZVP) attack (Akishita & Takagi, 2003) . In the next subsections, SPA and DPA attacks are described in more detail.
Simple Power Analysis
SPA attacks consist of observing the power consumption during a single execution of a cryptographic algorithm. The power consumption analysis may also enable one to distinguish between point addition and point doubling in Algorithm 1. Coron (1999) suggested performing point addition and point doubling each time. At the end of the loop, the result of the point addition operation will be either accepted or ignored according to the k i value (see Algorithm 4, which is known as the double-and-addalways algorithm).
Algorithm 4 (Double-and-add-always)
The disadvantage of Algorithm 4 is the extra fake point additions. Algorithm 4 requires (m-2) point doubling and (m-2) point additions, which is costly. ChevallierMames et al. (2004) proposed an efficient countermeasure against SPA attacks. The proposed countermeasure (Chevallier-Mames et al., 2004) , which is called side-channel atomicity, requires no additional computation overhead to resist against SPA attacks.
The computations of point operations are segmented into atomic blocks that are indistinguishable from each other; hence, no data are leaked regarding the operation being performed. However, even though the proposed countermeasures of Coron (1999) and Chevallier-Mames et al. (2004) are resistant to SPA attacks, they remain vulnerable to DPA attacks.
Differential Power Analysis
DPA attacks are based on the same basic concept as SPA attacks, but use error correction techniques and statistical analysis to extract very small differences in the power consumption signals. Several countermeasures have been proposed to resist against DPA attacks (Coron, 1999; Ha & Moon, 2002; Okeya & Sakurai, 2000; Liardet & Smart, 2001; Joye & Quisquater, 2001; Joye & Tymen, 2001a; Mamiya et al., 2004) .
These countermeasures include algorithms based on randomizing the private exponent (Coron, 1999) , blinding the base point P (Coron, 1999; Ha & Moon, 2002; Mamiya et al., 2004) , randomizing the projective coordinates (Coron, 1999) , using a random isomorphism of an elliptic curve (Joye & Tymen, 2001a) , and using special forms of certain elliptic curves such as the Montgomery form (Okeya & Sakurai, 2000) , the Jacobian form (Liardet & Smart, 2001) , or the Hessian form (Joye & Quisquater, 2001 ).
However, all of these countermeasures add computational overhead and are still vulnerable to recent DPA attacks such as the doubling attack (Fouque & Valette, 2003) , refined power analysis (RPA) attack (Goubin, 2003) , and zero-value point (ZVP) attack (Akishita & Takagi, 2003) .
The doubling attack works only for the most-to-least version of the double-andadd multiplication algorithm (Algorithm 1). The doubling attack assumes that the attacker can detect when the same point operation is done twice. More precisely, if 2A and 2B are computed in any operation, the attacker is not able to guess the value of A or B but can check if A = B or A ≠ B. This assumption is reasonable because this kind of computation usually takes many clock cycles and depends greatly on the value of the operands. If the noise is negligible, a simple comparison of the two power traces during the doubling will be sufficient to detect this equality.
Goubin (2003) proposed a new DPA attack, namely, the refined power analysis (RPA) attack. The RPA attack assumes that the attacker can input adaptively chosen messages or elliptic curve points to the victim's scalar multiplication algorithm. Smart (2003) analyzed the RPA attack in detail and discounted its effectiveness in a large number of orders. However, the RPA attack is still a threat to most ECCs.
The zero-value point (ZVP) attack is an extension of the RPA attack. In the RPA attack, the attacker uses a special point that has a zero-value coordinate. In the ZVP attack, however, an attacker utilizes an auxiliary register that might take a zero-value in the definition field. Thus, ZVP attacks pose a serious threat to elliptic curve cryptosystems.
Resistance against these recent DPA attacks can be achieved by combining two or more of the countermeasures proposed in the literature thus far. To protect against the doubling attack, the projective coordinates should be randomized or a random field isomorphism should be used, while to protect against RPA and ZVP attacks, the base point P or the scalar multiplier k should be randomized. Hence, to protect against all these recent DPA attacks, randomizing the scalar multiplier and randomizing the projective coordinates, for instance, can be applied together.
The Proposed Scheme
Mishra (2006) Overlapped parallel computations of scalar multiplication can provide different schemes depending on the selected projective coordinate system. Accordingly, different performance can result. In the proposed scheme, the mixed coordinate system is used to compute scalar multiplication (Cohen et al., 1998) . Point addition is computed by adding a point in the modified Jacobian coordinate system to another point in the affine coordinate system and the resulting point is in the modified Jacobian coordinate system. The time complexity of the above point addition is 9 multiplications + 5 squarings. In the proposed scheme, we do not distinguish between a multiplication and a squaring and neglect field additions and negations. Thus, point addition requires 14 field multiplications.
Point doubling is computed by adding a point in the modified Jacobian coordinate system to itself and the resulting point is also in the modified Jacobian coordinate system. Thus, doubling the point P 1 can be computed as where
Point doubling has a time complexity of only 4 multiplications and 4 squarings, which is equal to 8 multiplications as squarings are considered as multiplications here.
In the proposed scheme, the computations of point operations are divided into atomic blocks. An atomic block can contain at most one field multiplication, two field additions, and one field negation (Mishra, 2006) . Table 1 and Table 2 show the atomic blocks for point doubling and point addition, respectively, and empty field operations within an atomic block are marked by "*". Two multipliers and adders (Mishra, 2006) are used to perform the parallel computations of the atomic blocks in Table 1 and Table   2 .
Let the unit of time be the required time to execute an atomic block. Although the 8 atomic blocks of Table 1 can be computed in 4 time units using two parallel field multipliers, the critical path of Table 2 requires 8 time units using the same parallel field multipliers to compute the 14 atomic blocks. Thus, 2 empty slots in each point addition will result if a parallel scheme is used.
The computation of atomic blocks of subsequent point operations can be overlapped. The computation of a certain point operation can start without waiting for the preceding point operation to be totally computed. The atomic blocks of Table 1 and   Table 2 are arranged especially to allow overlapped parallel computations of the atomics blocks of subsequent point operations without any empty slots. Table 1 and   Table 2 are arranged in two columns to show one possible parallel computation of atomic blocks for point doubling and point addition, respectively. Atomic blocks within the same row in Table 1 and Table 2 can be computed in parallel. The first and the last row of Table 1 and Table 2 consist of an atomic block and an empty slot. Overlapping the computations of the first row of Table 1/Table 2 with the computations of the last row of Table 2/Table 1 will eliminate the empty slots without affecting the resulting point of scalar multiplication. Table 3 shows the proposed overlapped parallel scheme. In Table 3 , ∆ i s and Γ j s, which are the atomic blocks for point doubling and point additions, respectively, are each given a superscript to denote which point operation is in execution. Three scenarios can occur during scalar multiplication: double followed by double (DBL-DBL), double followed by addition (DBL-ADD), or addition followed by double (ADD-DBL). Table 3 shows the scheduling of the atomic blocks on the two multipliers (Mul 1 and Mul 2 ). Clearly, the two multipliers, which are the dominant parts, are fully utilized in the three possible scenarios, and no waiting slots exist except for the first and the last slots, which can be ignored. Table 4 shows the execution of the overlapped parallel computations using the same example provided in Mishra (2006) . In Table 4 , the scalar multiplier k is (100110) 
An Example of the Proposed Scheme with Resistance against SPA

Performance Analysis of the Proposed Scheme with Resistance against SPA
In this section, the performance of the proposed scheme is analyzed, and is compared only to the pipelined scheme of Mishra (2006) , which has outperformed previous parallel schemes.
The proposed scheme requires only two multipliers and two adders as in Mishra (2006). The memory requirement, however, is improved in comparison to the pipelined scheme in Mishra (2006) . For both Table 1 and Table 2 , only 11 memory locations are required. Memory locations R 1 -R 4 are used to store P 1 at the beginning and the end of point operations. These locations are also used as temporary memory locations during a point operation. Memory locations R 9 and R 10 are used to store the x-coordinate and the y-coordinate of point P 2, respectively. Finally, memory location R 11 is used to store the value of the elliptic curve parameter a. No further memory locations are required by the proposed scheme, which means that the proposed scheme reduces the memory location requirement by 35% in comparison to the pipelined scheme of Mishra (2006) Table 5 shows the time units required to compute scalar multiplication with m = 160 bits. The comparison between the time complexities of the proposed scheme and those of the pipelined scheme of Mishra (2006) shows that the proposed scheme provides better time complexity by 17% when binary encoding is used, and the percentage of improvement increases to 21% when NAF encoding is used.
The Proposed Scheme with Resistance against DPA Attacks
To protect the proposed scheme against all DPA attacks, two of Coron's countermeasures have been applied together: randomizing the scalar multiplier and randomizing the projective coordinates (Coron, 1999) . The computation of kP using scalar multiplier randomization can be done as follows.
• Select a random number r of size m bits.
• Compute k' = k + r #E.
• Compute the point Q = k'P.
• We have:
Randomization of the projective coordinates uses a random number λ ≠ 0. A point P = (X, Y, Z) on the elliptic curve is equal to (λX, λY, λZ) . The randomization of the projective coordinates can be performed at the beginning of computing kP or after each point operation depending on the required level of security.
Performance Analysis of the Proposed Scheme with Resistance against DPA Attacks
The proposed scheme uses two randomization countermeasures together to resist against DPA attacks: randomization of the scalar multiplier and randomization of the projective coordinates. Randomizing the scalar multiplier requires some routine computations that we will neglect, while projective coordinate randomization requires some extra field multiplications. Randomization of the projective coordinates can be at the beginning of computing kP or at the beginning of point operations depending on the required security level. To reach a moderate security level, the projective coordinates are randomized whenever a point addition operation is performed.
The proposed scheme performs point addition using mixed coordinates. In point addition operation, a point in the modified Jacobian coordinate system, which is represented by the quadruple (X, Y, Z, aZ 4 ), is added to the base point that is in the affine coordinate. Thus, to randomize the point that is represented in the modified Jacobian coordinate system, the point (X, Y, Z, aZ 4 ) should be (λX, λY, λZ, a(λZ) 4 ), which requires three extra field multiplications. Accordingly, the point addition atomic blocks have been changed in Table 6 to include the randomization of the projective coordinates. Table 7 shows the proposed overlapped parallel scheme with resistance against DPA attacks using Table 6 . Two of the three scenarios during scalar multiplication are changed: double followed by addition (DBL-ADD) and addition followed by double (ADD-DBL). In these two scenarios, point addition requires 9 time units to be computed and point doubling requires 4 time units. The main difference between Table   3 and Table 7 is the appearance of some waiting slots. Whenever an addition point operation is computed, there will be an empty slot that the point doubling operation cannot fill by overlapping. Table 6 requires one more memory location, R 12 , to store λ. The time complexity of the proposed scheme can be found as follows. Each double operation requires 4 time units to be completed, while point addition operation requires 9 time units. Thus, using binary encoding, a total of 1 + 4 × (m-1) + 9 × (m/2) time units is required. If NAF encoding is used, the total number of time units will be 1 + 4 × (m-1) + 9 × (m/3). Table 8 shows the required time units to compute scalar multiplication with m = 160 bits. The comparison between the time complexities of the proposed scheme with resistance against DPA attacks and those of the pipelined scheme of Mishra (2006) shows that the proposed scheme provides better time complexity by 6% if binary encoding is used, and the percentage of improvement increases to 13% if NAF encoding is used.
Overlapped Parallel Computations of the Comb Algorithm
The proposed scheme can be applied to the Comb scalar multiplication algorithm (Algorithm 3). The Comb algorithm uses precomputed points to perform scalar multiplications. These precomputed points serve as base points to perform scalar multiplication. Point addition in the Comb algorithm is performed between a point, resulting from a previous point doubling operation, and a precomputed point, which is stored in the memory. Thus, these precomputed points should be stored in affine coordinates as the proposed scheme in Section 4 assumes that the base point is in the affine coordinate.
The Comb algorithm requires (t -1) doublings on the average ((2 w -1/2 w )t-1) additions. Thus, the proposed scheme with resistance against SPA and DPA attacks requires 1 + 4 * (t -1) + 9 * ((2 w -1/2 w )t-1). Table 9 shows the computational cost for some typical values of w and t. The values in Column 3 refer to the cost of computing the scalar multiplication in time units. Clearly, the proposed scheme outperforms the pipelined scheme of Mishra (2006) .
In this paper, an efficient scheme for computing elliptic curve scalar multiplication has been presented. Side-channel atomicity has been used in the proposed scheme to resist against SPA attacks. The computations of point operations were divided into atomic blocks that contain one multiplication, two additions, and one negation. The inherent parallelism within point operations was exploited to perform parallel computations of atomic blocks within the same point operation. The computations of the atomic blocks of point operations were then overlapped to increase the performance.
An improvement by 35% of the required memory location requirement was achieved in the proposed scheme in comparison to the pipelined scheme. The time complexity of the proposed scheme was also improved by 17% and 21% in comparison to the pipelined scheme using binary and NAF encoding, respectively (see Table 5 ).
Two countermeasures, randomizing the scalar multiplier and randomizing the projective coordinates, were applied together to provide the proposed scheme with resistance against DPA attacks. By using these two randomization countermeasures together, the proposed scheme is protected against even recent DPA attacks, such as the doubling attack, RPA attack, and ZVP attack. The time complexity of the proposed scheme with resistance against DPA attacks was also improved by 6% and 13% in comparison to the pipelined scheme using binary and NAF encoding, respectively.
The proposed scheme was also applied to the Comb scalar multiplication algorithm. The time complexity of the proposed scheme when applied to the Comb algorithm was improved by 3-16% with different configurations in comparison to the pipelined scheme, which outperformed previous sequential and parallel schemes (see Table 8 ).
Table1: Point Doubling in Atomic Blocks (Mishra, 2006) 2 80 874 3% 3 Proposed Scheme 848 Pipelined (Mishra, 2006) 3 54 650 3% 7 Proposed Scheme 630 Pipelined (Mishra, 2006) 4 40 523 7% 15 Proposed Scheme 486 Pipelined (Mishra, 2006) 5 32 468 16% 31 Proposed Scheme 395
